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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms in a setting where the procure-
ment agency has incomplete information concerning the ﬁrms’ cost functions and cares
about quality as well as price. Low type ﬁrms are cheaper than high type ﬁrms in pro-
viding low quality but more expensive when providing high quality. Hence, each type is
specialized in a certain quality level. We show that this specialization leads to a bunching
of types on proﬁts, i.e. a range of ﬁrms with diﬀerent cost functions receives zero proﬁts
and therefore no informational rents. If ﬁrst best welfare is monotone in the eﬃciency
parameter, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a simple auction. If ﬁrst best
welfare is U-shaped in type, the optimal mechanism is not eﬃcient in the sense that types
providing a lower second best welfare win against types providing a higher second best
welfare.
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11. Introduction
Recently the market for home care was liberalized in the Netherlands. Local governments now
procure home care for their citizens and money saved on the procurement can be used now by
local governments for other things, like sports facilities (that is, the money received from the
central government to pay for home care is not earmarked). However, the local government
does have a duty to provide care (of some minimum standard). It used to be the case that
regional care oﬃces procured without much incentive to save money. Due to this liberalization,
new players have entered the market. In particular, cleaning companies have moved into home
care. As these new players have no experience with care (to illustrate, they did not use to hire
nurses or other professionals with a medical background) they are seen as low quality players.
At this low quality level, however, they are cheaper than traditional ﬁrms. That is, they can
provide simple services like house cleaning and shopping more cheaply than incumbent home
care companies. In this sense, incumbents are specialized in high quality production while
entrants are specialized in low quality/low costs production.1
This pattern –where incumbents are specialized in high quality service while entrants spe-
cialize in a low quality (low price) service– is typical after liberalization. Many European
countries have liberalized sectors like post, taxis, air transport, railway or local transport. This
has led to entry by players who oﬀer lower quality in, for instance, the following sense: only
make deliveries twice a week (instead of 6 days a week), drive cars substantially cheaper than a
Mercedes (see http://www.tuktukcompany.nl/ for an example), operate planes with reduced
seat pitch and limited on board service as well as oﬀering less connections, use old trains and
buses to transport people. A reaction often heard by customers and/or incumbents is that the
liberalization is bad for welfare because of the lower quality.2
In each of these cases, one could argue either that quality did not decrease at all or that
before liberalization quality was ineﬃciently high. In the former case, incumbents spread rumors
1To a certain extent this can be resolved through market segmentation. People who do not need medical
attention but only someone to clean their home, can be served by cleaning companies. While patients who
stay at home and need a nurse can be served by the incumbents. Hence at the extremes of the home care
spectrum, market segmentation can alleviate the issue. However, many cases in home care are not so clear cut.
To illustrate, a nurse helping an elderly woman putting on her clothes in the morning and cleaning the house
may recognize the ﬁrst signs of dementia that would be overlooked by an employee of a cleaning company.
2One could even take a broader point of view and also consider the case of foreign workers entering a domestic
labor market. In the EU there was a heated debate about Polish workers coming to the west in case Poland
would join the EU. Again some people argued that this is bad since Polish workers are supposedly less qualiﬁed
than domestic workers.
2to reduce the probability that entrants win contracts. In the latter case, after liberalization
quality goes down but total surplus rises. Presumably, in some of the examples mentioned
either of these two cases arise. However, we are interested in the case where indeed entrants
oﬀer both lower quality and lower total surplus than incumbents.3 The question we ask is: How
should a planner (in the home care example: the municipality) who wants to maximize welfare
optimally organize the procurement in the face of such low quality entrants?
A second motivation for the setup we analyze is the following: The private information of a
ﬁrm is often interpreted as the production technology it uses. This technology was determined
in the past and can therefore be treated as given in the context of one speciﬁc procurement con-
tract. Following this interpretation, one should expect that ﬁrms chose production technologies
that are not obviously inferior to alternative technologies, i.e. there should be some level of
quality for which the technology of a ﬁrm is eﬃcient. Put diﬀerently, ﬁrms are specialized in
the production of a certain quality level. As we argue below, this specialization is not covered
by standard procurement models that assume single crossing. In particular, single crossing
implies that high types are more eﬃcient than lower types for each possible quality level.
We show the following results. First, if the ﬁrms specialized in low quality (e.g. entrants
in the examples above) are indeed worse than high quality ﬁrms (incumbents in the examples)
in a ﬁrst best sense, the incumbents (under the optimal procurement rules) do not lose from
entry. Second, only if ﬁrst best welfare is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in type, types
specialized in high quality can lose in the following way: A low quality provider (entrant) can
win the procurement even though the high quality provider (incumbent) would provide higher
welfare under the optimal procurement rules. Third, in this latter case, quality is distorted
above ﬁrst best for some types and below ﬁrst best for others. Fourth, in both cases an interval
of types has zero proﬁts (“proﬁt bunching”). Although all types in this interval have zero
proﬁts, they produce diﬀerent qualities when winning the contract. Fifth, if ﬁrst best welfare
is monotone, relatively simple auctions can implement the optimal mechanism.
Technically speaking, a contribution of the paper is to solve a two-dimensional mechanism
design problem. A technical challenge is that local incentive compatibility is not straightfor-
wardly suﬃcient for non-local incentive compatibility, i.e. non-local incentive constraints have
to be checked explicitly. To illustrate the problem, view proﬁts as a function of the probability
3There are two reasons for this focus. First, as argued below, in the home care example mentioned above
there is evidence suggesting that the entrants oﬀer lower surplus. Second, if the entrants oﬀer higher surplus
than the incumbents, it is clear that they should be used by a value maximizing planner. Further, if the cheaper
entrants oﬀer higher surplus, no service should be procured from the incumbents.
3of getting the contract. The assumption that ﬁrms are specialized implies then that “marginal
proﬁts” (where marginal refers to a slightly higher probability of getting the contract) are not
monotone in type. This is equivalent to a violation of single crossing in one dimensional mod-
els. As is well known, non-local incentive compatibility does not follow from local incentive
compatibility if single crossing is not satisﬁed.
Our paper is related to the literature on procurement, especially to those papers in which
more than price matters, e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (1987), Che (1993), Branco (1997), Asker
and Cantillon (2008) or Asker and Cantillon (2010). These papers assume that ﬁrms are not
specialized, i.e. higher types have lower costs for all quality levels. This assumption seems
to be too strong in some settings, e.g. newly liberalized industries. We show that relaxing it
leads to bunching on zero proﬁts which is, to our knowledge, a new result in the literature on
procurement auctions.
In some sense, our paper connects the literature on competitive procurement with the litera-
ture on countervailing incentives, see Lewis and Sappington (1989) for the seminal contribution
and Jullien (2000) for the most general treatment. By assuming that ﬁrms are specialized, our
paper uses a cost function reminiscent of countervailing incentives. As this literature focuses
on scenarios with one agent, the probability of being contracted is one. Consequently, local
incentive compatibility constraints are suﬃcient for non-local incentive compatibility and many
of the technical challenges encountered in our paper do not occur. From an applied point of
view, having more than one ﬁrm leads to the result that optimal procurement auctions can be
second best ineﬃcient.
The set up of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model. Section 3 analyzes
the case where ﬁrst best welfare is monotonically increasing in type while section 4 deals with
U-shaped ﬁrst best welfare. In the latter case we ﬁnd a discrimination result, i.e. some types
with lower second best welfare are preferred to types with higher second best welfare. Section
5 shows how the model extends to situations in which the assumptions of section 2 are not met
and section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. Model
We consider the case where a social planner procures a service of quality q ∈ Q ⊂ IR+ where Q
is a convex set. The gross value of this service is denoted by S(q) where we normalize quality
4in such a way that S(q) = Sq for some S > 0.4 The cost of production is denoted by c(q,θ)
where the ﬁrm’s type θ is distributed with distribution (density) function F(f) on [θ, ¯ θ]. We
assume that c is (at least) three times continuously diﬀerentiable.
We make the following assumptions on the cost function c and distribution function F.
Assumption 1 We assume that
• the function c(q,θ) satisﬁes cq,cqq > 0,cqθ < 0,cθθ ≥ 0,
• for q ∈ Q it is the case that S is high enough compared to c(q,θ) that the planner always
wishes to procure and
• the function F satisﬁes
d((1−F(θ))/f(θ))
dθ < 0 and
d(F(θ)/f(θ))
dθ > 0 .
These assumptions are standard in the literature. The ﬁrst part says that c is increasing
and convex in q. Higher θ implies lower marginal costs cq (the Spence-Mirrlees condition) and
c is convex in θ. It will become clear that this convexity is part of the idea of specialized ﬁrms.
The second assumption formalizes the idea in our home care application that the government
cannot decide not to provide the service. That is, it is always socially desirable for the service
to be supplied. The third part is the monotone hazard rate (MHR) assumption. Usually this
assumption is only made “in one direction”. However, in the literature on countervailing incen-
tives it is standard to have MHR “in both directions”, see for example Lewis and Sappington
(1989) or Jullien (2000). Well known distributions that satisfy MHR include normal, uniform
and exponential distributions.5 In section 5, we discuss what happens if MHR is not satisﬁed.
The following assumption states that ﬁrms are specialized which is the case we want to
analyze in this paper.
Assumption 2 For each θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ], there exists k(θ) > 0 such that
cθ(q,θ)
 
> 0 if q < k(θ)
< 0 if q > k(θ)
4This is, given our assumptions on the cost function, without loss of generality for weakly concave gross
values S(q).




≤ 0 if q < k(θ)
≥ 0 if q > k(θ)
cqqθ(q,θ)
 
≥ 0 if q < k(θ)
≤ 0 if q > k(θ)
Hence for high values of q, a higher type θ produces q more cheaply. This is the usual
assumption. We allow for the possibility where low values of q are actually more cheaply
produced by lower θ types. To illustrate, high θ incumbents may have invested in (human)
capital that makes it actually relatively expensive to produce low quality. If the quality of the
product is mainly determined by the qualiﬁcation of the staﬀ, incumbents might have more
expensive but also more qualiﬁed workers. Replacing these workers is, especially in Europe,
costly because of labor market rigidities and search costs.6 Consequently, it is more expensive
for incumbents to produce low q than for entrants (and the other way around for high q). Note
that kθ(θ) ≥ 0 follows from cθθ ≥ 0 and cqθ < 0 by diﬀerentiating cθ(k(θ),θ) = 0 with respect to
θ (see proof of lemma 1). In words, as θ increases the quality level k(θ) where cθ = 0 (weakly)
increases.
To make sure that (i) the planner’s objective function is concave in q and (ii) quality q
increases in type, it is standard in the literature to make assumptions on third derivatives
cqθθ,cqqθ. If cθ does not switch sign, the usual assumption is that these derivatives should not
switch sign either. This is diﬀerent in our case. To ease the exposition we make the assumptions
on the third derivatives above and discuss in section 5 what changes if these assumptions are
not satisﬁed. Note that we allow for the simple case where these third derivatives are equal to
zero.
As cθ can be positive, it is not clear how ﬁrst best welfare varies with θ. Below we deﬁne
the two cases that we consider here. In order to do this, we introduce the following notation.




Sq − c(q,θ) (1)





6That incumbents have more expensive and better qualiﬁed staﬀ is evident in the home care sector in the
Netherlands which we mentioned in the introduction. Incumbents’ employees have a training in nursing, while
entering cleaning companies employ mostly low skilled labor.
6Our ﬁnal assumption makes sure that we can focus on two relevant cases only.
Assumption 3 Assume that c2
qθ > cθθcqq.
This assumption implies that ﬁrst best welfare is convex in θ. Hence we only need to
consider two cases. Either ﬁrst best welfare is increasing in θ or it is ﬁrst decreasing and then
increasing in θ. Further, we can show that ﬁrst best quality increases faster with θ than k(θ);
a result that we use below.
Lemma 1 First best welfare W fb(θ) is convex in θ and q
fb
θ (θ) > kθ(θ).
Now we deﬁne the two cases that we focus on in this paper.
Deﬁnition 1 We consider the two cases
(WM) where ﬁrst best welfare is monotone in θ:
dW fb(θ)
dθ > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] or
(WNM) where θw exists such that
dW fb(θ)
dθ < 0 for θ ∈ [θ,θw) and
dW fb(θ)
dθ > 0 for θ ∈ (θw, ¯ θ];
further W fb(¯ θ) > W fb(θ).
Hence we exclude the case where W fb(¯ θ) < W fb(θ) (and by lemma 1 this is the only case
we exclude). In words, we keep on thinking of high (enough) θ as better.7
The following two examples give cost and surplus functions that correspond to cases (WM)
and (WNM) resp.
Example 1 Assume S(q) = q and c(q,θ) = (q − θ)2 + q(1 − θ/2) where θ is distributed
uniformly on [0,1]. With these functions k(θ) = 4θ/5 and qfb(θ) = 5θ/4. First best welfare is
W fb(θ) = 9
16θ2 which is increasing in θ ∈ [0,1].
The interpretation of this example could be that by the qualiﬁcation of its staﬀ a ﬁrm
has the “natural quality level” θ. Producing at diﬀerent qualities involves adjustment costs
that increase with the distance |q − θ|. Additionally, there is a linear cost of quality, e.g.
from additional (non-staﬀ) input factors. A high type ﬁrm, e.g. a ﬁrm that traditionally has
had highly qualiﬁed staﬀ and therefore is experienced in high quality production, has lower
additional costs of quality.
7Clearly, the opposite case with W fb(¯ θ) < W fb(θ) is symmetric and does not need to be considered separately.
7Example 2 Assume S(q) = Sq and c(q,θ) = 1
2q2 − θq + θk with k ∈ (S + θ,S + ¯ θ). Thus
k(θ) = k in assumption 2. Then we ﬁnd that qfb(θ) = S +θ and dW fb(θ)/dθ = S +θ−k which
is negative (positive) for θ < (>)k − S ∈ (θ, ¯ θ).
The second example reﬂects the standard idea that a ﬁrm with high ﬁxed costs (kθ) has
lower marginal costs (cq = q − θ) of producing quality. That is, a ﬁrm that produces with a
more capital intensive technology might have lower marginal costs for quality but higher ﬁxed
costs.
Now we are able to set up the mechanism design problem. The planner only needs one ﬁrm
to supply the desired service or product. Since n ≥ 2 ﬁrms are able to supply, the planner needs
to determine: which ﬁrm wins the procurement, what quality level should this ﬁrm supply and
how much money should be transferred to ﬁrms in return for this.
Let t(θ) denote the (expected) transfer paid by the planner to a ﬁrm of type θ and x(θ) the
probability that type θ wins the procurement. That is, the planner oﬀers a menu of choices
for ﬁrms and each ﬁrm chooses the option that maximizes its proﬁts. The payoﬀ for a type θ
player that chooses option (q,x,t) is written as t − xc(q,θ).8
Following Myerson (1981), we use a direct revelation mechanism. That is, we design a menu
of choices where (q(θ),x(θ),t(θ)) is the choice “meant for” type θ. Then we make it incentive
compatible (IC) for type θ to choose this option. That is, it is IC for θ to truthfully reveal his
type.
Type θ can misrepresent as ˆ θ and its proﬁts equal
π(ˆ θ,θ) = t(ˆ θ) − x(ˆ θ)c(q(ˆ θ),θ) (3)
A menu q(·),x(·),t(·) is IC if and only if
Φ(ˆ θ,θ) ≡ π(θ,θ) − π(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ 0 (4)
for all θ, ˆ θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].




8Note that since ﬁrms’ and planner’s utility is quasilinear in money, it does actually not matter whether t is
paid conditional on winning or not.
8Hence, using an envelope argument, incentive compatibility implies
πθ(θ) = −x(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ) (6)
This equation makes sure that the ﬁrst order condition for truthful revelation of θ is satisﬁed.
The next result derives a tractable form for the local second order condition.
Lemma 2 For the second order conditions to be locally satisﬁed, we also need that
xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ)qθ(θ) ≤ 0. (7)
As shown in textbooks like Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), ﬁrst and second order conditions
above imply global IC (as in equation (4)) if cθ < 0 for all q ∈ Q. Because we assume that
ﬁrms are specialized (assumption 2), local IC does not automatically imply global IC. Hence,
we need to verify explicitly below that global IC is satisﬁed.
Intuitively, assumption 2 is similar to a violation of single crossing. Viewing ﬁrm’s payoﬀ,
t − xc(q,θ) as a function of x, the standard single crossing assumption would require that
the derivative of t − xc(q,θ) with respect to x is monotone in type, i.e. single crossing would
require that cθ does not change sign. But assumption 2 states exactly the opposite. It is
well known that in models without single crossing non-local IC can become relevant, see for
example Araujo and Moreira (2010) or Schottm¨ uller (2011). We will ﬁrst neglect these non-
local incentive constraints and verify ex post that they do not bind. Although there are some
issues with deﬁning single crossing in multidimensional models (see for example McAfee and
McMillan (1988)), we refer to cθ switching sign as a “violation of single crossing”.
Finally, because cθ can switch sign, it is not clear that π(θ) = 0. That is, we cannot rule out
that π(θ) > 0 while π(θ) = 0 for some θ > θ. Hence, we need to explicitly track the individual
rationality constraint
π(θ) ≥ 0 (8)
where we normalize ﬁrms’ outside option to zero.
We assume that the planner maximizes utility Sq minus the transfer paid to ﬁrms. If the
planner assigns the project to player i with probability xi where i produces quality qi and
receives transfer ti, the planner’s utility from i can be written as xiSqi −ti = xi(Sqi −ci)−πi.
Above, we did not index q and x by i = 1...n although we have n ﬁrms. It will be shown now
that this is indeed unnecessary because of the symmetry of the problem. To do so, we write
9the planner’s optimization problem9 including the ﬁrm identiﬁer i
max
  ¯ θ
θ
...




























































where λi(·) and µi(·), ηi(·) ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers (co-state variables) of the con-
straints (6), (7) and (8). Here, xi(Θ) denotes the probability of ﬁrm i being contracted when
types are Θ = (θ1 ...θn). The last constraint ensures that probabilities sum to no more than
1. Because of assumption 1, this constraint will bind and σ(Θ) will therefore be positive. The
second but last term secures nonnegativity of the contracting probabilities where the Lagrange
multiplier τi(Θ) ≥ 0.































= σ(Θ) + τ
i(Θ). (9)
As the objective function is linear in xi(·), we get what is called a “bang-bang” solution in
optimal control theory: For any Θ, the ﬁrm i with the highest left hand side in (9) is contracted,
i.e. xi(Θ) = 1, while the other ﬁrms are not, i.e. xj(Θ) = 0 for all j  = i.
With this simple structure for the decision x(Θ), the maximization problem is totally sym-
metric across all i. In particular, the ﬁrst order conditions for qi(·) and πi(·) are the same for
all i. Consequently, we can use a notationally much simpler formulation of the maximization
problem
max
  ¯ θ
θ
f(θ)[x(θ)(Sq(θ) − c(q(θ),θ)) − π(θ)] (10)
+ λ(θ)(πθ(θ) + x(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ))
− µ(θ)(xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ)qθ(θ))
+ η(θ)π(θ)dθ
9We immediately focus on the case with non-random qualities, i.e. each type’s quality is a deterministic
function of his type only. Appendix E in Jullien (2000) can be easily adapted to our setting to show that
optimal mechanisms are indeed deterministic under our assumptions.
10where λ(·) and µ(·),η(·) ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers (co-state variables) of the constraints
(6), (7) and (8) respectively.
The Euler equation for π(·) implies
λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ) (11)
The ﬁrst order condition for q(·) can be written as
f(θ)(S − cq(q(θ),θ)) + λ(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ) + µ(θ)cqθθ(q(θ),θ) = −µθ(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ). (12)
Deﬁne the virtual valuation of type θ as




If constraint (7) is not binding, the planner’s objective function is linear in x(θ), where x(θ)
is multiplied by V V (θ). Hence, using standard arguments, the ﬁrm with the highest V V wins
the procurement contract.
The following two lemmas are useful in the analysis below. The ﬁrst lemma establishes that
we have a monotone hazard rate property for our case where single crossing is not satisﬁed.
Lemma 3 If either
(i) λ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ] and λ(¯ θ) = 0 or





for values of θ with η(θ) = 0.
As we will see below, the property in equation (14) is useful to have. It is part of the set of
conditions to make quality q monotone in θ. Case (i) is relevant for the (WM) case and case
(ii) for (WNM). If η(θ) > 0, it turns out that the monotonicity of quality is easy to prove (see
the discussion of proﬁt bunching below).
Lemma 4 Assume µ(θ) = 0 and
d(λ(θ)/f(θ))
dθ < 0 for all θ with η(θ) = 0. Then
111. if there is ˆ θ such that q(ˆ θ) = k(ˆ θ) then qθ(ˆ θ) ≥ kθ(ˆ θ),
2. if there is θ′ such that cθ(q(θ′),θ′) ≤ 0 then cθ(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0 for all θ > θ′ and
3. if there exist θ1,θ2 > θ1 with π(θ1) = π(θ2) = 0 then π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ1,θ2].
The ﬁrst result says that if q and k coincide for some value ˆ θ, then it cannot be the case
that k exceeds q for higher values of θ. Further, it is the case that once cθ ≤ 0 for the optimal
q(θ) then cθ stays non-positive for all higher θ. Finally, the third result implies that if two types
have zero proﬁts then all types in between have zero proﬁts as well. That is, there cannot be
a type θ ∈ [θ1,θ2] with positive proﬁts (and negative proﬁts are excluded by equation (8)).
Finally, we use the following notation. Let qh(θ) denote the solution to10
S − cq(q(θ),θ) +
1 − F(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ),θ) = 0 (15)
and ql(θ) the solution to11
S − cq(q(θ),θ) −
F(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ),θ) = 0 (16)
In the following two sections we solve the problem for the WM and then the WNM case.
The strategy will be to solve the ﬁrst order condition and then to verify ex post that (7) and
non-local incentive constraints do not bind under our assumptions. Section 5 returns to the
case where (7) is not satisﬁed.
3. First best welfare monotone
We will now characterize the optimal mechanism for the WM-case. The following lemma is
useful to characterize the optimal menu. The lowest type θ receives lowest proﬁts (zero) and
the IC constraint (6) is binding downwards. That is, high types would like to mimic low types
(not the other way around).
Lemma 5 In the WM-case we have: π(θ) = 0 and λ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].
10If several q solve this equation, we denote the highest by qh. By assumption 1 and 2, there can be at most
one q > k(θ) satisfying equation (15).
11If the solution to this equation is not unique, let the lowest solution be ql. By assumption 1 and 2, there is
at most one q < k(θ) satisfying equation (16).
12Now we are able to characterize the solution for the WM case. There are two cases to
consider. In the ﬁrst case, the solution (given by equation (15)) is such that the violation of
single crossing plays no role. This is basically the solution to a standard problem. In the second
case, low θ types are bunched on zero proﬁts (but with diﬀerent quality levels) and from θb ≥ θ
onwards, q(θ) follows the solution in equation (15).
Proposition 1 There are two cases:
1. If cθ(qh(θ),θ) < 0, then qh(θ) in equation (15) gives the solution for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ]. We
have πθ(θ),qθ(θ),xθ(θ) > 0 for each θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].
2. If cθ(qh(θ),θ) ≥ 0 then there exists a largest θb ≥ θ such that
q(θ) = k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ,θb]
and θb is determined by the unique solution to
S − cq(k(θb),θb) +
1 − F(θb)
f(θb)
cqθ(k(θb),θb) = 0 (17)
For all θ > θb quality q(θ) = qh(θ). We have
π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θb],
πθ(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θb, ¯ θ], and
xθ(θ),qθ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, ¯ θ].
In the ﬁrst case of proposition 1, the possibility that cθ can change sign does not play a
role in the relevant range of q. Therefore, the standard menu as in Che (1993) results. In the
second case, cθ would be positive for some types in the standard quality menu which is given
by (15). A direct corollary of lemma 1 is that cθ ≤ 0 at the ﬁrst best quality level. Hence,
the standard downward distortion of q caused by the rent extraction motive is responsible
for having cθ > 0 for some types under qh. By (6), proﬁts are decreasing at types where
cθ > 0. If qh was implemented, type θb would therefore have zero proﬁts while lower types
would have positive proﬁts. But now the principal can do better than qh: By assigning k(θ)
to types below θb, the principal (i) saves rents as those types remain at zero proﬁts and (ii)
reduces distortion compared to qh. Because each type is most cost eﬃcient at his k(θ), no other































Figure 1: Optimal q(θ) (solid, red) in the WNM case, together with (dashed)
ql(θ),qfb(θ),k(θ),qh(θ).
diﬀerently, the incentive constraint is lax in this situation. Therefore, it is not necessary to
distort quality further down than k(θ) for rent extraction purposes.
In conclusion, the menu in case 2 of proposition 1 consists of a standard part for high types
and one part where types produce at k(θ) and consequently the incentive constraint is lax. This
already gives the intuition for the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The solution in proposition 1 is globally incentive compatible.
4. First best welfare non-monotone
In this section, ﬁrst best welfare is U-shaped. The lowest type θ is no longer worst (in a ﬁrst
best sense) and therefore he might have positive proﬁts under the optimal mechanism. The
following lemma conﬁrms this intuition.
Lemma 6 Under WNM, π(θ) > 0, π(¯ θ) > 0 and λ(θ) = λ(¯ θ) = 0.
One can think of the WNM case as having two standard menus. One for lower θ in which
lower types are better, proﬁts are decreasing in type and quality is distorted upwards. The
other for higher θ with higher types being better, proﬁts increasing in type and quality distorted
downwards. These two menus have to be reconciled.
14A ﬁrst idea could be that bunching on quality12 might be used to connect the two menus. It
is quickly shown that this does not work. To see this, suppose –by contradiction– that q(θ) = qb
for types θ in the bunching interval. As proﬁts are decreasing in θ for low θ and increasing in
θ for high θ, the type θ′ with the lowest proﬁts (π(θ′) = 0) would have to be in the bunching
interval. From (6), the proﬁt minimizing type has to satisfy cθ(qb,θ′) = 0. Hence, he produces
at qb = k(θ′) and is for this quality level the most eﬃcient type. But then he has the highest
proﬁts of all types in the quality-bunching interval. This contradiction implies that a menu
with quality bunching cannot be the solution.13
The right way to reconcile the two standard menus is an interval of types with zero proﬁts
(but diﬀering quality levels). Incentive compatibility within the bunched interval is no problem
here. Each bunched type θ will produce at quality level k(θ) at which he has lower costs than
any other type. The following proposition describes the optimal menu in the WNM case.
Proposition 3 There exist unique θ1 and θ2, with θ1 < θ2, such that ql(θ1) = k(θ1) and





qh(θ) for all θ > θ2
k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]
ql(θ) for all θ < θ1
(18)
We have
π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]
πθ(θ) < 0 for all θ < θ1
πθ(θ) > 0 for all θ > θ2
qθ(θ) ≥ 0
Type θw, who has the lowest ﬁrst best welfare of all types, is in the zero proﬁt interval and
produces his ﬁrst best quality. It holds that
xθ(θ) < 0 for all θ < θw
xθ(θ) > 0 for all θ > θw
12See, for instance, Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
13Unless it happens at qb = k in the case where k(θ) = k is constant. This is what we call bunching on (zero)
proﬁts.
15Figure 1 illustrates proposition 3. Quality is above ﬁrst best, i.e. upwards distorted, for
low θ and downwards distorted for high θ. This is a consequence of the U-shaped ﬁrst best
welfare which implies that low types are better around θ and high types are better around ¯ θ.
Quality is not distorted at the (locally) best types θ and ¯ θ which resembles the well known “no
distortion at the top” result. Quality is also undistorted for the worst type θw which allows a
continuous transition from upwards to downwards distortion.
The boundaries of the zero proﬁt interval [θ1,θ2] are at those types where the low standard
menu and the high standard menu feature q(θ) = k(θ). In the zero proﬁt interval each type
produces the quality for which he is the cost minimizing type, i.e. k(θ). Any other quality
could not be incentive compatible within a zero proﬁt interval as either types slightly higher
or slightly lower would be more eﬃcient. But then they could achieve positive proﬁts by
misrepresenting. From q(θ) = k(θ), it is evident that misrepresenting as any other type θ ∈
[θ1,θ2] cannot be proﬁtable and this is exactly the reason why the zero proﬁt types do not
receive any informational rent.
At θ1 and θ2, q(θ) is kinked. At θ1, for example, the quality according to the standard low
menu (ql) would include additional informational distortion pushing quality upwards. Therefore
ql(θ) > k(θ) for types slightly above θ1 while q(θ) = k(θ) is necessary to stay in the zero proﬁt
interval.
Further, the solution in proposition 3 satisﬁes equation (4).
Proposition 4 The solution in proposition 3 is globally incentive compatible.
The following proposition formalizes the “grudge” of high θ incumbents against low θ en-
trants: although in second best the incumbent generates higher quality and higher welfare than
the entrant, it can happen that the entrant wins the procurement contract. Incidentally, the
opposite can happen as well: an incumbent wins from an entrant who generates higher (second
best) welfare.
Proposition 5 The optimal allocation is not (second best) eﬃcient in the sense that there exist
types θ′,θ′′ such that θ′ wins against θ′′ while W sb(θ′′) > W sb(θ′).
A similar result is well known in auctions with asymmetric bidders. Myerson (1981) shows
that it is optimal to discriminate between bidders drawing their valuations from diﬀerent dis-
tributions. In our case, however, there is only one distribution from which types are drawn.
16Nevertheless, the intuition is similar. The reason for discrimination are informational dis-
tortions. For the lower standard menu, the relevant term inducing distortion in the virtual
valuation is −F(·)cθ(·). For high θ, the respective term is (1−F(·))cθ(·). While discrimination
in Myerson (1981) results from the fact that diﬀerent distributions govern the distortion, dis-
crimination in our model is due to diﬀerent parts of the same distribution governing distortion:
For low θ, the left tail is relevant and for high types the right tail of the distribution matters
for distortion. The reason is that the local incentive constraint is upward binding in the lower
standard menu and downward binding in the upper standard menu.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of how to implement the optimal menus in
propositions 1 and 3. We argue that this is more straightforward for the WM than for the WNM
case. In each case, we have in mind that the government announces at the start its willingness
p = t/x to pay (conditional on winning) for each quality level q. In case 1 in proposition 1,
the government can then organize a second price auction to determine the ﬁrm that wins the
contract. The ﬁrm with the highest bid, wins and pays the second highest bid. This ﬁrm is
then allowed to choose its combination (q,p) from the menu announced by the government.
Since the planner wants the highest type to win and proﬁts are strictly increasing in θ, such an
auction selects the right type as winner. Since we assume that the service is valuable enough
that it has to be supplied, there is no reserve price in this auction.
However, in the second case in proposition 1 there are a number of types with equal (zero)
proﬁts while the planner prefers higher θ for the case where quality increases in θ. The auction
described above is not optimal here since it cannot discriminate between types with the same
proﬁts. In that case, the selection mechanism must be based on quality directly. To be more
precise, let ﬁrms bid qualities. The ﬁrm bidding the highest quality wins, produces this quality
and receives payment p (according to the menu announced by the government).
In the WNM case, there is no standard implementation mechanism. The planner’s prefer-
ence over winning types is given by the virtual valuation V V in equation (13). Again, a price
auction cannot work because of the zero proﬁt interval: These types have the same valuation
for winning the auction but should have diﬀerent probabilities of winning (V V (θ) and thus x(θ)
is not constant over θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]). An auction based on quality does not work either because qθ
and xθ do not have the same sign for all types. Further, a scoring rule auction, as analyzed in
Che (1993), cannot implement the optimal mechanism either. This can be seen as follows.
Consider a scoring rule of the form score(p,q) = s(q) − p, where the price p is (only) paid
to the winner of the auction. In a second score auction, the second highest score, score(2),
17determines the rents going to the winner. Hence, in a second score auction, it is a dominant




To implement the optimal mechanism, it must be the case that the ﬁrst order condition
sq(q) − cq(q,θ) = 0
yields q(θ) as given by equation (18). As shown by Che (1993), it then follows that






−1(s)) ds for q ∈ [q(θ),q(¯ θ)]
and −∞ for all other q; where q−1(s) is the inverse of q(θ) and λ(θ) is the Lagrange multiplier
(co-state) of the optimal menu derived in proposition 3.
This implies that the winner is determined by the ﬁrm bidding the highest value of







while in the optimal mechanism, the winner has the highest value of V V as given by equation
(13).14 Put diﬀerently, if the scoring rule implements the optimal mechanism it has to hold
that bid(θ′) = bid(θ′′) whenever V V (θ′) = V V (θ′′) under the optimal mechanism. The following
proposition says that generically this is untrue under WNM.
Proposition 6 Generically, a simple scoring rule auction cannot implement the optimal mech-
anism in the WNM case.
Consequently, more general mechanisms are needed for implementation in the WNM case.
As shown in proposition 5, the (optimal) government’s decision may be criticized ex post in
case a ﬁrm loses from a winner generating lower (second best) welfare. If the government
cannot implement the optimal mechanism because of its complexity, more ineﬃciencies will be
introduced in the WNM case.
14Note that there is also an issue in choosing the right tie-breaking rule. From the envelope theorem,
dbid(θ)
dθ =
−cθ(q(θ),θ). Therefore, all types with zero proﬁts have the same bid because q(θ) = k(θ) for them which implies
dbid(θ)
dθ = 0. The tie breaking rule should follow V V (θ) here, making the mechanism not easy to implement.
185. Robustness
Above we made some assumptions on third derivatives of the cost function and the distribution
of θ for ease of exposition. Here we discuss how the solution changes when these assumptions
are no longer satisﬁed. In principle, there are two possible problems that can arise: First, the
second order condition (7) could be violated in the derived solution. Second, the program is no
longer globally concave.
5.1. Violation second order condition
For concreteness, we focus here on the WM case and assume that the problems arise because
of a violation of the MHR assumption. The cases where third derivatives cause problems with













The assumptions made above are suﬃcient conditions for qθ(θ) ≥ 0. Hence, if F does not
satisfy the MHR assumption, it can still be the case that qθ(θ) ≥ 0 and xθ(θ) ≥ 0.15 If q and x
are non-decreasing in θ, we know that the second order condition (7) is satisﬁed. Even if, say,
qθ(θ) < 0 while xθ(θ) > 0, equation (7) can still be satisﬁed.
Now we consider the case where d((1 − F(θ))/f(θ))/dθ > 0 for θ > θb in such a way that
qθ < 0 causes a violation of (7). We ﬁrst sketch how this is dealt with in general. Then we work
out an example. As shown by Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
for the case of a single dimensional decision (say, only quality), a violation of the second order
condition leads to bunching: several θ-types produce the same quality. However, in our case
the decision is two dimensional: quality q and the probability of winning x. In fact, below we
do not work with x but with the virtual valuation V V as there is a one-to-one relation between
the two (i.e. higher V V implies higher x and the other way around). We show that in this
two-dimensional case, it is not necessarily true that a violation of (7) leads to bunching of types
θ to the same quality q and probability of winning x.
We use ﬁgure 2 to illustrate the procedure. This ﬁgure shows equation (7) (where it holds
with equality) in (q,V V ) space and the solution (q(θ),V V (θ)) that follows from the planner’s
15Whether xθ ≥ 0 can be derived from the expression for dV V (θ)/dθ in equation (39).
19Figure 2: Solution for quality q(θ) and virtual valuation V V (θ) for the case where (second
order) condition (7) is violated.
optimization problem while ignoring the second order condition; i.e. assuming µθ(θ) = 0 for all










In the simple case (that we also use in the example below) where cθθ = 0, this curve boils down
to
x(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ) = −K < 0 (20)
for some constant K > 0, as diﬀerentiating equation (20) with respect to θ indeed gives xθcθ +
xcqθqθ = 0.
The solution (q(θ),V V (θ)) ignoring the second order constraint, starts at θ in the bottom
left corner and moves ﬁrst over the thick (red) part of this curve, then follows the thin (blue)
part, curving back (i.e. both q and x fall with θ) then both q and x increase again with θ and
we end on the thick (red) part of the curve. The part of the curve where qθ,xθ < 0 violates
equation (7).
Hence we need to ﬁnd θa,θb where (7) starts to bind and µ(θ) > 0. Then from θa onwards,
we follow the binding constraint till we arrive at θb, from which point onwards we follow the
solution (q(θ),V V (θ)) again. As shown in ﬁgure, the choice of θa determines both the trajectory
(˜ q(θ), ˜ V V (θ)) satisfying equation (7) and the end point of this trajectory θb. Since µ(θ) = 0
both for θ < θa and for θ > θb, it must be the case that
  θb







Figure 3: Inverse hazard rate with f(θ) = (θ − a)2 + 1/50
case where cqθθ = 0,16 this can be written as (using equation (12)):
  θb
θa
f(θ)(S − cq(˜ q(θ),θ)) + (1 − F(θ)cqθ(˜ q(θ),θ)
cqθ(˜ q(θ),θ)
dθ = 0 (21)
We now illustrate this approach with an example.
Example 3 To violate the monotone hazard rate assumption we use the density f(θ) = (θ −
a)2 +1/50 with support [0,a+ 1/4] where a has to be approximately 1.42 to satisfy the require-
ments of a probability distribution. The hazard rate of this distribution is depicted in ﬁgure
3.
Assume that there are two ﬁrms and that c(q,θ) = 1
2q2−qθ+θ. Then cθ(q,θ) = 1−q which




for some K > 0. Note that this equation does not depend on θ. Hence in this case, “following
the constraint” takes the form of bunching θ ∈ [θa,θb] on some point
(˜ q, ˜ V V ) (22)
where ˜ V V corresponds to the probability ˜ x = K
˜ q−1. Choosing θa, ﬁxes ˜ q = q(θa) and θb since
q(θb) = ˜ q. Writing the dependency of ˜ q,θb on θa explicitly, θa solves equation (21):
  θb(θa)
θa
f(θ)(S − (˜ q(θa) − θ)) − (1 − F(θ))dθ = 0 (23)
Since equation (7) will already start to bind for θa where qθ(θa) > 0, it is routine to verify that
this equation is downward sloping in θa. The unique solution in this example is θa ≈ 1.1685
which gives a corresponding θb = 1.428 and ˜ q = 1.923.
16If cqθθ  = 0, the diﬀerential equation (12) has to be solved for µ(θ). Although a bit tedious, this is do-able
since the diﬀerential equation is linear and ﬁrst order in µ(θ).
21While the ironing procedure described above takes care of the local second order condition
(7), this does not necessarily imply global incentive compatibility. Global constraints are math-
ematically intractable in general frameworks; see Araujo and Moreira (2010) and Schottm¨ uller
(2011) for special examples of how to handle global constraints. However, the following propo-
sition establishes that global constraints do not bind for a family of cost functions. This family
includes the functions we used in the example and the most commonly used linear-quadratic
cost functions.
Proposition 7 If cθθ = 0 and the local second order condition (7) is satisﬁed, the solution is
globally incentive compatible.
5.2. Concavity in q
The second possible problem with cqqθ not satisfying assumption 2 is that the planner’s objective
function (10) is not necessarily globally concave in q(·). However, in principle, the solution will
still satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions derived before. In particular, it is never optimal to choose
q → ∞: Since costs are convex and the principal’s utility is linear in q, costs are higher than
beneﬁts for q high enough and therefore optimal qualities cannot be arbitrarily high. Hence, if
Q is not bounded, the solution will be interior and satisfy the conditions derived above.
If the set of available qualities is a compact subset of IR+, corner solutions could play a role;
e.g. if quality cannot be higher than some level ¯ q, some types might have q(θ) = ¯ q and the ﬁrst
order conditions do not apply for them. However, such a situation can be easily approximated
by a continuous cost function which is very steep around ¯ q (instead of jumping discontinuously
to inﬁnity) and to which our analysis would apply.
6. Conclusion
We analyzed a procurement setting in which the procurement agency cares not only about
the price but also about the quality of the product. In many post liberalization situations
incumbents seem to be good at producing high quality while entrants can produce low quality
at very low costs. A similar pattern emerges if there are gains from specialization and ﬁrms
can specialize in either high quality or low costs.
Standard procurement models do not account for this possibility because single crossing is
assumed from the start. More precisely, it is assumed that “type” denotes eﬃciency and not
22specialization. This implies that a more eﬃcient type is simply better for all quality levels. We
relax this assumption and allow each type to be specialized, i.e. to be the most most eﬃcient
type for some quality level. This leads to a bunching of types on zero proﬁts. The intuition is
that distorting quality further than the quality level a type is specialized in (for rent extraction
reasons) is not necessary: A type producing “his quality level” with expected proﬁts of zero
cannot be mimicked by any other type. Hence, the incentive constraint is lax and an interval
of zero proﬁt types is feasible.
If we assume that ﬁrst best welfare is U-shaped, e.g. there are gains from specializing in low
costs even from a welfare point of view, we get an interesting discrimination result. Types with
lower second best welfare can be preferred to types with higher second best welfare. This is
similar to auctions with asymmetric bidders where discriminatory mechanisms are well known.
Contrary to this literature, bidders are drawn from the same distribution in our model. The
intuition is that the incentive constraint is ﬁrst upward and then, for higher types, downward
binding. Therefore, diﬀerent parts of the distribution govern the distortion for low and high
types. Further, in this case “gold plating” can be optimal in the sense that some types produce
quality levels above their ﬁrst best levels.
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24A. Appendix: Proofs














− cθθ > 0
from the assumptions made on the function c(q,θ). Further, it follows from cθ(k(θ),θ) ≡ 0 that
cqθkθ(θ) + cθθ = 0. Hence q
fb






which holds by assumption 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2 Deﬁne the function
Φ(ˆ θ,θ) = π(θ,θ) − π(ˆ θ,θ) ≥ 0
By IC this function is always positive and equal to zero if ˆ θ = θ. In other words, the function
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= xθ(θ)cθ(q(θ),θ) + x(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ)qθ(θ) ≤ 0
25which is the inequality in the lemma. Q.E.D.





f(θ)2 < 0 (26)
We consider the following four cases:
λ(θ)
≥ 0 < 0
≥ 0 (α) (β) fθ(θ)
< 0 (δ) (γ)
Let’s consider the two cases in the lemma in turn.
Case (i): We can solve
λ(θ) = 1 − F(θ) −
  ¯ θ
θ
η(t)dt (27)
Hence we need to show
−f(θ)
2 − λ(θ)fθ(θ) < 0 (28)
where we use η(θ) = 0. This is obviously satisﬁed in case (α). In case (δ) we have
−f(θ)
2 − (1 − F(θ) −
  ¯ θ
θ
η(t)dt)fθ(θ) < 0
Then this inequality is implied by the MHR assumption 1 where we write d((1−F(θ))/f(θ))/dθ <
0 as
−f(θ)
2 − (1 − F(θ))fθ(θ) < 0 (29)
because η(t) ≥ 0. As we assume λ(θ) ≥ 0, we do not need to consider cases (β,γ).
Case (ii): Here we have a second way in which we can write λ(θ):




Equation (28) is clearly satisﬁed in cases (α),(γ). Case (δ) is satisﬁed for the same reason as
above. Hence we only need to consider case (β). Using equation (30), we write inequality (28)
as
−f(θ)




where we use η(θ) = 0. Then this inequality is implied by the MHR assumption 1 where we
write d(F(θ)/f(θ))/dθ > 0 as
−f(θ)
2 + F(θ)fθ(θ) < 0 (31)
26and η(t) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4 We prove the parts in turn.
Part 1.: Suppose not, that is assume that q(ˆ θ) = k(ˆ θ) (i.e. cθ(q(ˆ θ), ˆ θ) = 0) and qθ(ˆ θ) <
kθ(ˆ θ). Then for ε > 0 small enough, it is the case that
cθ(q(ˆ θ + ε), ˆ θ + ε) > 0
and thus (by (6))
πθ(ˆ θ + ε) < 0
This is only feasible if π(ˆ θ) > 0 and thus η(ˆ θ) = 0. With µ(θ) = 0 the ﬁrst order condition (12)
becomes
S − cq(q(θ),θ) +
λ(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ),θ) = 0 (32)
Using the implicit function theorem we ﬁnd
qθ =
cqθ(−1 + (λ/f)′) + cqθθλ/f
cqq − cqqθλ/f
(33)
As derived in the proof of lemma 1, kθ =
cθθ
−cqθ. Comparing qθ and kθ in the point ˆ θ we can
simplify the expression in (33) by noting that cqθθ = cqqθ = 0 for θ = ˆ θ by assumption 2. Using







which leads to a contradiction because the left hand side is negative by assumption 3 and the
right hand side is positive by assumption. Hence it must be the case that qθ(ˆ θ) ≥ kθ(ˆ θ) at such
a point ˆ θ.
Part 2. Suppose not, that is there exists θ′′ > θ′ such that cθ(q(θ′′),θ′′) > 0. This implies
that there exists ˆ θ ∈ [θ′,θ′′) such that q(ˆ θ) = k(ˆ θ) and qθ(ˆ θ) < kθ(ˆ θ). Part 1 of this lemma
shows that this is not possible.
Part 3. The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose, proﬁts were positive on some interval
(ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2) with θ1 < ˆ θ1 < ˆ θ2 < θ2.17 Quality q(θ) for θ ∈ (ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2) will be determined by (32) with
λ(θ) = 1−F(θ)−
  ¯ θ
ˆ θ2 η(θ) dθ. Clearly, there has to be a type ˆ θ ∈ (ˆ θ1, ˆ θ2) at which π(θ) attains
a local maximum. From (6), it follows that cθ(q(ˆ θ), ˆ θ) = 0. Put diﬀerently, q(ˆ θ) = k(ˆ θ). Since
proﬁts are increasing for ˆ θ − ε and decreasing for ˆ θ + ε, (6) implies that
qθ(ˆ θ) < kθ(ˆ θ)
17By continuity of π(θ), it cannot be the case that π(θ) > 0 only in a point.
27which is impossible by part 1 of this lemma. This is the required contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 5 In order to proof this, we need the following result.
Lemma 7 At all qualities greater or equal to his ﬁrst best quality qfb(θ), the costs of type θ are
lower than the costs of all ˜ θ < θ, i.e. c(q,θ) < c(q, ˜ θ) ∀q ≥ qfb(θ) and ˜ θ < θ.
Proof of lemma 7 At qfb(θ) the claim follows from the increasing ﬁrst best net value as-
sumption (WM): If a lower θ had the same or lower costs at qfb(θ), he could produce at least
the same net value by producing at qfb(θ). For higher qualities note that the cost diﬀerences
between producing qfb(θ) and q > qfb(θ) is decreasing in ˜ θ ≤ θ:
dc = c(q, ˜ θ) − c(q
fb(θ), ˜ θ) =
  q
qfb(θ)
cq(k, ˜ θ)dk (35)
Because of cqθ < 0, this term is decreasing in ˜ θ and the claim follows. Note that an implication
of this claim is that
cθ(q,θ) < 0 for all q ≥ q
fb(θ) (36)
as otherwise a marginally lower type would have lower costs. Q.E.D.
The proof of lemma 5 is by contradiction. Suppose there exists θ′ such that λ(θ′) < 0.
Since the transversality condition implies λ(¯ θ) = 0,18 it follows from the continuity of λ(θ)
that there must be an interval of types in between θ′ and ¯ θ where λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ) > 0.
This can only happen if η(θ) > 0 or equivalently π(θ) = 0 on this interval. On such a zero
proﬁt interval cθ(q,θ) = 0 as πθ(θ) would not be zero otherwise.19 Hence, each type produces
a quality such that he is the cost minimizing type for this quality. Furthermore, each of these
types has π(θ) = 0. These two facts imply that incentive compatibility cannot be a problem
on the zero proﬁt interval. In other words, we can ignore constraint (7) on this interval, i.e.
µ(θ) = 0 on this interval.
Denote the lowest type with zero proﬁts as θ1 = inf{θ|π(θ) = 0}. Note that from what was
said above λ(θ1) < 0 and µ(θ1) = 0. Furthermore, cθ(q(θ1 − ε),θ1 − ε) > 0 for ε > 0 small
enough.20 Equation (36) then implies q(θ1 −ε) < qfb(θ1−ε). However, this contradict the ﬁrst
order condition with respect to q(·):
f(θ)(Sq(q(θ)) − cq(q(θ),θ)) + λ(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ) + µ(θ)cqθθ(q(θ),θ) = −µθ(θ)cqθ(q(θ),θ) (37)
18Because the highest type has strictly positive proﬁts (see below).
19The alternative would be x(θ) = 0. But this is obviously not possible on an interval of types by assumption
1.
20This follows form the deﬁnition of θ1: Since he is the lowest type with zero proﬁts π(θ1 − ε) > 0 and
therefore proﬁts have to be decreasing at θ1 − ε for ε small enough.
28Since µ(θ1) = 0, we can ignore the µ(θ1−ε) term for ε > 0 small enough. Further, µθ(θ1−ε) ≤ 0
since µ(θ) ≥ 0. But then cθq < 0 and λ(θ1−ε) < 0 imply Sq(q(θ1−ε))−cq(q(θ1−ε),θ1−ε) < 0
which contradicts q(θ1 − ε) < qfb(θ1 − ε). Hence, there is a contradiction and λ(θ) ≥ 0 has to
hold.
To prove the other part of the lemma, suppose (again by contradiction) that π(θ) > 0. Con-
sequently, the dynamic optimization problem will include the transversality condition λ(θ) = 0.
Given that λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ), this implies that λ(θ) < 0 for some interval of θ starting at
θ.21 As we just proved, it is not possible to have λ(θ) < 0. This is the required contradiction
and we conclude that π(θ) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1
We will analyze the problem without the incentive constraint (7) ﬁrst, i.e. µ(θ) = 0, and
show in proposition 2 that it is satisﬁed. The ﬁrst order condition (12) becomes
S − cq(q(θ),θ) +
λ(θ)
f(θ)
cqθ(q(θ),θ) = 0 (38)
Since ¯ θ is the best type (in a ﬁrst best sense), we expect his proﬁts to be positive and therefore
η(¯ θ) = 0 and also the transversality condition λ(¯ θ) = 0 holds (indeed below we verify that
π(¯ θ) > 0). Therefore (11) implies λ(θ) = 1 − F(θ) for some high types for which the proﬁt
constraint does not bind. Note that for this case, equation (38) can be written as (15).
Now we have two cases. With the solution qh(θ) given by (15) it is the case that either
1. cθ(qh(θ),θ) < 0 or
2. cθ(qh(θ),θ) ≥ 0
The ﬁrst case implies that q(θ) > k(θ). Hence for the ﬁrst case, π(θ) = 0 and πθ(θ) > 0 for
(at least) θ close to θ (see equation (6)). It follows from part 2 of lemma 4 that cθ(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0
for all θ. Thus πθ ≥ 0 for each θ > θ and the proﬁt constraint π(θ) ≥ 0 does not bind for θ > θ.
Therefore the solution in equation (15) is the overall solution.
Finally, consider the virtual surplus in equation (13) with λ(θ) = 1 − F(θ). Using an











cθθ > 0 (39)
21To be precise, this follows from the continuity of π(θ): As π(θ) > 0, proﬁts have to be positive for some
interval of low θ and consequently η(θ) = 0 for those θ. This implies λ(θ) < 0.
29Since the project is allocated to the ﬁrm with the highest V V , it is allocated to the ﬁrm with
the highest θ. Thus xθ(θ) > 0.
Now consider the second case in proposition 1 with cθ(qh(θ),θ) ≥ 0.
Lemma 8 If cθ(qh(θ),θ) ≥ 0, then q(θ) = k(θ).
Proof of lemma 8 If cθ(qh(θ),θ) = 0, the lemma is true.
If cθ(q(θ),θ) > 0 then πθ(θ) < 0. Then π(θ) = 0 (lemma 5) implies that this violates the
constraint that proﬁts should be non-negative. In this case the solution cannot be given by
equation (15) as the proﬁt constraint is binding. Hence the solution q(θ) is given by equation
(32) where (see equation (11)) λ(θ) is given by equation (30). This solution cannot feature
cθ(q(θ),θ) > 0 as this would lead to a violation of π(θ) ≥ 0 for θ close to θ.
The following argument shows that cθ(q(θ),θ) < 0 is not possible either. In this case
πθ(θ) > 0. Then either (i) there exists θ′ > θ such π(θ′) = 0 or (ii) q(θ) = qh(θ). Case (i) leads
to a contradiction because of lemma 4. If (i) does not happen, then η(θ) = 0 for all θ > θ,
which implies case (ii). However, case (ii) with cθ(q(θ),θ) < 0 contradicts the assumption in
the lemma that cθ(qh(θ),θ) ≥ 0.
Thus we have cθ(q(θ),θ) = 0 or equivalently q(θ) = k(θ). Q.E.D.
Because of lemma 8, there is a largest θb ≥ θ such that q(θ) = k(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ,θb]. This
θb is uniquely deﬁned.
Since π(θ) = 0 and πθ = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θb], we have π(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θb].
Uniqueness of θb as deﬁned in (17) follows from the fact that the expression in equation
(17) is strictly increasing in θb. Diﬀerentiating the expression with respect to θb and using













We can only leave the interval [θ,θb] if πθ(θb+ε) > 0 for ε > 0 small enough. Then π(θ) > 0
for all θ > θb. If not, there would be θ′ > θb such that π(θ′) = 0 which contradicts lemma 4.
Hence q(θ) = qh(θ) for all θ > θb and equation (17) makes sure that q(θ) is continuous.
As in the previous case, we have qθ(θ) > 0 for θ > θb. For θ ∈ [θ,θb] we have q(θ) = k(θ)
which is (strictly) increasing in θ if cθθ > 0. If cθθ = 0, quality is constant over the range
θ ∈ [θ,θb].











cθθ ≥ 0 (40)
where the inequality is strict for θ > θb and for θ ∈ [θ,θb] if cθθ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 The monotonicity of x(θ) and q(θ) together with cθ ≤ 0 and
cqθ < 0 imply that the local incentive compatibility constraint (7) is satisﬁed.
For global incentive compatibility we ﬁrst show that no θ can proﬁtably misrepresent as
ˆ θ > θ. This is true if
π(θ) − π(ˆ θ) − x(ˆ θ)[c(q(ˆ θ), ˆ θ) − c(q(ˆ θ),θ)] ≥ 0
Using (6), this can be rewritten as
  ˆ θ
θ
x(t)cθ(q(t),t) − x(ˆ θ)cθ(q(ˆ θ),t) dt ≥ 0
This last inequality can be rewritten as
  ˆ θ
θ
  ˆ θ
t
xθ(s)cθ(q(s),t) + x(s)cqθ(q(s),t)qθ(s) dsdt ≤ 0 (41)
The second term of the integrand is negative by the monotonicity of q(θ) in proposition 1. Note
that we saw in the proof of proposition 1 that cθ(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0 for all types. Since t ≤ s and
cθθ ≥ 0, clearly ct(q(s),t) ≤ 0 in the ﬁrst term of the integrand. As xθ ≥ 0 in proposition 1,
inequality (41) has to hold.
To show that no θ gains by misrepresenting as ˆ θ < θ we use the following notation introduced
in equation (3).
π(ˆ θ,θ) = t(ˆ θ) − x(ˆ θ)c(q(ˆ θ),θ)
The idea is to deﬁne the following cost function
˜ c(a,θ) = min{c(q(a),a),c(q(a),θ)} (42)
where q(a) is the optimal quality schedule derived above. Next deﬁne
˜ π(a,θ) = t(a) − x(a)˜ c(a,θ) (43)
31The following inequalities show that the solution derived above satisﬁes IC globally as well:
π(ˆ θ,θ) − π(θ,θ) (44)
≤ ˜ π(ˆ θ,θ) − ˜ π(θ,θ) (45)
=























xθ(a)(˜ c(q(a),θ) − c(q(a),a)) + x(a)(˜ ca(q(a),θ) − cq(q(a),a)qθ(a))da (48)
≤ 0 (49)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the deﬁnition of ˜ c(·) and the observation that ˜ π(θ,θ) =







= 0 by the ﬁrst order condition of truthful
revelation. Equation (48) follows from the deﬁnitions of the derivatives of π(a,θ) and ˜ π(a,θ)
w.r.t. a. The ﬁnal inequality follows from the properties xa(a),qa(a) ≥ 0 and the following
three observations. First, by deﬁnition of ˜ c(·) we have
˜ c(q(a),θ) − c(q(a),a) ≤ 0
Second, for values of a where ˜ c(a,θ) = c(q(a),θ) we have
˜ ca(q(a),θ) − cq(q(a),a)qa(a) = (cq(q(a),θ) − cq(q(a),a))qa(a) ≤ 0
because cqθ ≤ 0. Finally for values where ˜ c(a,θ) = c(q(a),a) we have
˜ ca(q(a),θ) − cq(q(a),a)qa(a) =
∂c(q(a),θ)
∂θ





because in our solution cθ(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 6 We show that a menu featuring π(θ) = 0 is not optimal. In the WNM
case, ﬁrst best welfare is decreasing in type around θ. A standard envelope argument shows
that this implies cθ(qfb(θ),θ) > 0. Now suppose, π(θ) = 0. Then πθ(θ) ≥ 0 which implies
cθ(q(θ),θ) ≤ 0 by (6). Therefore, q(θ) > qfb(θ). But then a simple change in the menu would
be beneﬁcial and therefore the menu cannot be optimal: Change q(θ) to qfb(θ) and adjust
transfers such that π(θ) stays zero. As θ has again zero proﬁts his incentive compatibility does
not change. Reducing quality will make θ’s menu point even less attractive for other types.22
By the deﬁnition of qfb(·), this change is beneﬁcial. Q.E.D.
22This argument can be made formal using the same dc expression as in the proof of lemma 7.
32Proof of proposition 3 Again the global IC constraint will be neglected. It will become
clear in the proof of proposition 4 that it is satisﬁed nevertheless.
From lemma 6 we know that π(¯ θ),π(θ) > 0 and therefore the transversality conditions
λ(¯ θ) = λ(θ) = 0 have to hold. Furthermore, the positive proﬁt constraint is non binding and
therefore η(¯ θ) = η(θ) = 0. By (11) and the continuity of π, we have λ(θ) = 1 − F(θ) > 0 close
to ¯ θ and λ(θ) = −F(θ) < 0 close to θ. For these two expressions of λ(·), the monotone hazard
rate assumption implies that the quality schedule determined in (32) is increasing in type, i.e.
qθ(θ) > 0.
Next we proof the existence of θ1 and θ2. By continuity of λ(θ),23 there exists an interval
[˜ θ1, ˜ θ2] such that λθ(θ) = −f(θ) + η(θ) > 0 and thus π(θ) = 0. Consequently, πθ(θ) = 0 for
all θ ∈ [˜ θ1, ˜ θ2]. Let θ1 (θ2) denote the lowest (highest) ˜ θ1 (˜ θ2) such that this is true for all
θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]. By continuity of q(θ) it follows that ql(θ1) = k(θ1) and qh(θ2) = k(θ2).
As shown in the proof of proposition 1 the expression in equation (17) is strictly increasing
in θb. This implies the uniqueness of θ2 = θb. With a similar argument one shows that




is increasing in θ. This implies the uniqueness of θ1 which solves





S − cq(k(θ),θ) −
F(θ)
f(θ)




for all θ it follows that indeed θ1 < θ2.
By the uniqueness of θ1 and θ2, cθ is positive for θ < θ1 and negative for θ > θ2. Together
with (6) this implies the sign of πθ as stated in the proposition.
In (θ1,θ2), there has to be a type with λ(θ) = 0. From (32), this type produces his ﬁrst
best quality and as he is in the zero proﬁt interval qfb(θ) = k(θ). The only type satisfying
this conditions is the type with the lowest ﬁrst best welfare θw. Note that all θ < (>)θw have
cθ(q(θ),θ) ≥ (≤)0 and also λ(θ) < (>)0. Diﬀerentiating the virtual valuation with respect to θ













23In particular, to connect λ(θ) < 0 for small θ with λ(θ) > 0 for high θ, we need λθ > 0 over some range.
33From the paragraph above and the monotone hazard rate assumption, the virtual valuation,
and therefore x(θ), has to be decreasing on [θ,θ1] and increasing on [θ2, ¯ θ]. On (θ1,θ2), cθ is
zero and as λ ﬂips sign at θw the proposition follows.
It was already mentioned that q(θ) is increasing for types with positive proﬁts. Since k(θ)
is non-decreasing, q(θ) is non-decreasing for all θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4 All θ ∈ [θ1,θ2] produce at k(θ) which is the quality level at which
a type has lower cost than any other type. Since these types also have zero proﬁts, no other
type can proﬁtably misrepresent as θ ∈ [θ1,θ2]. For θ ≥ θw the menu is equivalent to the one
described in proposition 1. Therefore, proposition 2 implies non-local IC on this part of the
menu. The same proof as for proposition 2 with reversed signs implies that the menu for θ < θw
is non-locally IC.
What remains to be shown is that no type θ < θw can proﬁtably misrepresent as θ′ > θw







′),t) dt < 0 (51)
The inequality follows from the fact that k(θ),k(θ2) < q(θ′) and cqθ < 0. Therefore, the
















The ﬁrst term in the last expression is negative because incentive compatibility between θ2 and
θ′ is satisﬁed (proposition 2) and the second term is negative because of equation (51).
The proof for θ > θw and θ′ < θw works in the same way with θ1 in place of θ2. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 5 Consider θ′ = θ. Deﬁne W = W fb(θ) = W sb(θ). Since θ produces
his ﬁrst best quality and ﬁrst best welfare is decreasing at θ, there are types θ > θ with lower
welfare than W. By the deﬁnition of the (WNM)-case, W fb(¯ θ) > W.
Taking these two points together and applying the intermediate value theorem yields the
existence of a type θ′′ such that W sb(θ′′) = W and W sb
θ (θ′′) > 0.
dW sb(θ)
dθ




where the ﬁrst order condition for q(·) is used for the second equality. From proposition 3
and its proof we know that λ and cθ both change sign at θw and therefore sign(λ(θ)) =
−sign(cθ(q(θ),θ)). Consequently, W sb
θ (θ′′) > 0 implies λ(θ′′) > 0 and cθ(q(θ′′),θ′′) < 0.
34The virtual valuation can be written as





and thus V V (θ) ≤ W sb(θ) since λ and cθ have opposite signs and the inequality is strict if
λ(θ),cθ(q(θ),θ)  = 0.
If cθ(q(θ′′),θ′′) < 0 it then follows that V V (θ) > V V (θ′′). By continuity, there exist types θ
that yield strictly higher welfare than θ but still lose from θ in the procurement.
Now consider the case where θ′′ ∈ (θ1,θ2) such that cθ(q(θ′′),θ′′) = 0. In this case there are
types close to θ that lose from types close to θ′′ although the former yield higher (second best)
welfare W sb. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 6: If the scoring rule implements the optimal mechanism it has to
hold that bid(θ′) = bid(θ′′) whenever V V (θ′) = V V (θ′′) under the optimal mechanism.
Now take θ1 and θ2 as deﬁned in proposition 3. Because bidθ(θ) = −cθ(q(θ),θ) and all
θ ∈ (θ1,θ2) have q(θ) = k(θ), it follows that bid(θ1) = bid(θ2). As virtual valuation and bids
are continuous in type, this implies that V V (θ1) = V V (θ2) has to hold if the scoring rule
implements the optimal mechanism: Otherwise, types slightly below θ1 and slightly above θ2
have the same bid but diﬀerent virtual valuations. Since q(θi) = k(θi), the virtual valuation for
θi is Sk(θi) − c(k(θi),θi) for i = 1,2. Consequently, the following equation has to hold if the












Note that this equation uniquely pins down θ2 for a given θ1.24 Furthermore, it does so inde-
pendent of the distribution of types. However,θ2 is deﬁned by the equation S − cq(k(θ),θ) +
1−F(θ)
f(θ)cqθk(θ),θ) which depends on f(θ2). Hence, slightly perturbing f around θ2 changes θ2 but
not the equation above. Consequently, a scoring rule auction cannot implement the optimal
mechanism in a generic sense. Q.E.D.
24The reason is that the integrand is negative around θ1, positive around θ2 and changes sign only at one
type which is between θ1 and θ2. This follows from lemma 1.
35Proof of proposition 7 As shown in the proof of proposition 2, incentive compatibility
between θ and ˆ θ boils down to the inequality
  ˆ θ
θ
  ˆ θ
t
xθ(s)cθ(q(s),t) + x(s)cθq(q(s),t)qθ(s) dsdt ≤ 0.
Now note that cθθ = 0 implies
xθ(s)cθ(q(s),t) + x(s)cθq(q(s),t)qθ(s) = xθ(s)cθ(q(s),s) + x(s)cθq(q(s),s)qθ(s).
But then global incentive compatibility has to be satisﬁed as xs(s)cθ(q(s),s)+x(s)cθq(q(s),s)qs(s) ≤
0 by the local second order condition. Q.E.D.
36